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PRODUCTION RELATIONS AND P O L I T I C S  I N  THE AMERICAN MINING INDUSTRIES 
by 
S h a r o n  R e i t m a n  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  f o r  t h e  P r o g r a m  o n  C o n f l i c t  M a n a g e m e n t  A l t e r n a t i v e s .  
P l e a s e  do not  c i t e  ' o r  q u o t e  w i t h o u t ' w r i t t e n  p e r m i s s i o n  f r o m  t h e  a u t h o r .  

Much of the literature on working-class political formation 
assumes a positive relationship between repression and radicalism; 
the more repressive shopfloor production regimes,' the greater the 
likelihood that workers will embrace radical politics. This 
assumption guides discussions of the evolution of the American labor 
movement. The transition from militant and radical unions early in 
this century to labor conservatism in the post-World War I1 era is 
said to be a consequence of a labor capital accord, bureaucratic 
control, or hegemonic control;2 organized workers have abandoned 
radical political goals in favor of cooperative arrangements with 
employers. The benefits of such arrangements include high wages, 
1 I am using the term "production regime" to refer to the 
relatively stable methods employers and workers use to regulate class 
conflict. My use of the term is derived from Michael Burawoy's 
discussions of factory regimes. Although other theorists refer to 
similar processes as forms of control, I find that terminology 
unsatisfactory because it implies that employers impose forms of 
control on workers. "Production regime" more aptly conveys the 
notion that class relations are jointly constructed by workers and 
employers as they struggle over competing interests. The patterns of 
class relations I am discussing may also be thought of as conflict 
management strategies insofar as both workers and employers attempt 
in their interactions with one another to regulate the production 
process. However, I have chosen not to use the term "conflict 
management" because it implies a more self-conscious sense of purpose 
on the parts of miners and employers than was the case. Moreover, 
conflict management implies at least an attempt among conflicting 
parties to solve disputes in a cooperative manner. Such a 
cooperative intent may or may not be a factor in determining the form 
that production relations take. ~ichael Burawoy, "Between the Labor 
Process and the State: The Changing Face of Factory Regimes Under 
Advanced Capitalism, " American Sociological Review 48 (October 1983) : 
587-605, and The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes Under 
Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985). 
2 These views are discussed in Beth Rubin, "Class Struggle 
American Style: Unions, Strikes and Wages," American Sociological 
Review 51 (October 1986) : 618-633; Richard Edwards, Contested 
Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Basic Books, 1979); Michael Burawoy, "Between the Labor 
Process and the State," and The Politics of Production. 
opportunities for mobility within the firm, and job stability. Put 
differently, workers have become more conservative during the latter 
half of the twentieth century because production regimes have become 
less repressive. 
Assuming there is a relationship between production regimes and 
working-class politics, the sources of different kinds of production 
regimes is the first question that must be addressed. This paper 
addresses that question through a comparison of the bituminous coal 
mining and the precious metal mining industries in the United States. 
At the turn of the century, production regimes in the coal mining 
industry were hegemonic; they were guided by a cooperative agreement 
between miners and employers that set limits on strikes as well as on 
the United Mine Workers of America's (UMWA) political activities. 
3 
In exchange, miners received wage increases and union recognition. 
Production regimes in the metal mining industry, by contrast, were 
despotic. Indeed, the mine owners' attempts to disband the metal 
miners' union, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), were among the 
most repressive in the history of the American labor movement. 
Interestingly, these outcomes are opposite the predictions of 
the literature; competition among employers and paternalism -- which 
characterized the coal mining industry but not the metal mining 
industry -- are said to be associated with despotic production 
3 Hegemonic regimes are those "in which consent prevails, 
although not to the exclusion of coercion. Not only is the 
application of coercion circumscribed and regularized, but the 
infliction of discipline and punishment itself becomes the object of 
consent." Michael Burawoy, "Between the Labor Process and the 
State," p. 590. 
 regime^.^ This paper attributes the failure to correctly predict 
where despotic and hegemonic production regimes will emerge on an 
overemphasis in the literature on employers' ability to control the 
production process as well as on inattention to workers' union and 
work traditions. 
This paper also examines some consequences of the two types of 
production regimes. It demonstrates that despotism in the western 
metal mining industry resulted in radical political traditions that 
were passed from generation to generation. At the same time, 
despotic production regimes significantly weakened organized labor in 
the metal mining industry. In the eastern coal mining industry, by 
contrast, hegemonic production regimes increased the power of the 
UMWA dramatically, increased coal miners' standard of living 
precipitously, but also produced discord between the union leadership 
and the rank-and-file miners and set limits on the UMWA1s political 
opt ions. 
D e s p o t i c  P r o d u c t i o n  R e g i m e s  
Michael Burawoy delineates three conditions that are associated 
with despotic regimes: deskilling, competition among employers, and 
the fusion of production with reproduction. Deskilling deprives 
workers of the power that is derived from intimate knowledge of a 
4 Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain; Michael Burawoy, 
"Between the Labor Process and the State," and The Politics of 
Production. 
craft; the more simplified the job, the less dependent employers are 
on the skills of any particular worker. Deskilling subordinates 
workers by making them interchangeable. 
5 
Competition among employers makes the subordination of workers 
vital to the survival of the firm. Competition places a downward 
pressure on prices and profits. Employers compensate by reducing 
wages, increasing hours, and introducing labor-saving machinery. As 
Burawoy summarizes, "Anarchy in the market leads to despotism in the 
factory . ,, 6 
Burawoy argues that the third condition, the fusion of 
production with reproduction is the most critical in terms of 
demarcating the transition from despotic to hegemonic regimes. The 
fusion of production with reproduction refers to a situation in which 
workers are entirely dependent on their wages and have no alternative 
means of economic support. Such complete dependency leaves employers 
little reason to grant concessions. It is only when the state 
intervenes in the production process, Burawoy maintains, by 
guaranteeing workers a livelihood when they are unemployed or by 
setting restrictions on employer behavior within the workplace, that 
employers will find despotism untenable. 
7 
-- 
5 See also Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The 
Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1974). 
6 Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the 
Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), p. 194. See also Richard Edwards, Contested 
Terrain. 
7 Burawoy argues that state intervention in production in 
the 1930s transformed production politics in the United States and 
marked the transition from despotic production regimes to hegemonic 
ones. However, because, as Richard Edwards points out, industries 
Given these three conditions, the production regimes that 
miners and their employers created in the two mining industries pose 
a theoretical anomaly. Because metal mining was more despotic, we 
would expect that deskilling, employer competition, and miners' 
dependency on employers would be greater than in the coal mining 
industry. But that was not the case. There was little difference in 
the skills that were required of metal miners and coal miners: the 
labor processes were similar; the technological innovations that are 
often associated with deskilling were introduced at roughly the same 
time; and the two groups of miners enjoyed comparable degrees of 
8 
autonomy from management. Moreover, the second and third conditions 
of despotism -- competition among employers and workers' dependency 
on employers -- were more salient in the coal mining industry, where 
and industrial sectors develop unevenly, earlier regimes may survive 
in sectors that are difficult for the state to regulate. Michael 
Burawoy, "Between the Labor Process and the State," and Richard 
Edwards, C o n t e s t e d  T e r r a i n .  
8 Discussions of the labor processes include Harold Barger 
and Sam H. Schurr, T h e  Mining I n d u s t r i e s ,  1899-1930: A  S t u d y  of 
O u t p u t ,  Employment and P r o d u c t i v i t y  (New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc., 1944) ; Hugh Archbald, T h e  Four Day i n  Coal:  
A S t u d y  o f  the R e l a t i o n s  Between the E n g i n e e r i n g  and O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
Work and the D i s c o n t e n t  Among Workers  i n  the  Coal Miners  (New York: 
The H. W. Wilson Company, 1922); Keith Dix, "Work Relations in the 
Coal Industry: The Handloading Era, 1880-1930," in Case S t u d i e s  o f  
the Labor P r o c e s s ,  ed. Andrew Zimbalist (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1979), pp. 156-169; Carter Goodrich, T h e  Miners '  Freedom: A 
S t u d y  o f  the Working L i f e  i n  a  Changing I n d u s t r y  (Boston: Marshall 
Jones Company, 1925); Isador Lubin, Miners '  Wages and the Cos t  o f  
C o a l :  An I n q u i r y  i n t o  t h e  Wages S y s t e m  i n  the B i t u m i n o u s  Coal 
I n d u s t r y  and i t s  E f f e c t s  on Coal C o s t s  and Coal C o n s e r v a t i o n  (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1924); Ronald C. Brown, Hard-Rock Miners:  The 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n  West, 1860-1920 (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 1979); Stephen Voynick, L e a d v i l l e :  A Miners '  E p i c  (Missoula: 
Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1984). Otis E. Young, Jr., 
W e s t e r n  Mining:  An In formal  Account of P r e c i o u s - M e t a l s  P r o s p e c t i n g ,  
P l a c e r i n g ,  Lode Mining,  and M i l l i n g  on the American F r o n t i e r  From 
S p a n i s h  Times  t o  1893 (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1970). 
hegemonic product ion  regimes p r e v a i l e d .  Although anarchy i n  t h e  
market l e d  t o  despot i sm i n  t h e  c o a l  mines du r ing  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  
cen tu ry ,  anarchy i n  t h e  market, I w i l l  a rgue ,  was a l s o  one of  t h e  
main causes  of hegemony i n  t h e  mines d u r i n g  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  cen tu ry .  
How was it p o s s i b l e  t o  have hegemony i n  t h e  c o a l  mining 
i n d u s t r y  and despot i sm i n  t h e  me ta l  mining indus t ry?  Two f a c t o r s  
shaped product ion  regimes: r e g i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  con tex t s  and miners '  
p r e e x i s t i n g  union t r a d i t i o n s .  This  pape r  add re s se s  t h e  l a t t e r  
f a c t o r .  
From Despotism to Hegemony: Production Regimes in the Coal 
Mining Industry 
Following a  n a t i o n a l  s t r i k e  among bituminous c o a l  miners  i n  
1897, t h e  United Mine Workers of America e n t e r e d  i n t o  a  j o i n t  
9  
agreement wi th  c o a l  o p e r a t o r s .  The j o i n t  agreement was conceived of 
by union l e a d e r s ,  and i t  was an a t tempt  t o  e r a d i c a t e  despot i sm i n  t h e  
mines by e l i m i n a t i n g  compet i t ion  among employers; miners  b e l i e v e d  
t h a t  i f  t h e y  could  b r i n g  o p e r a t o r s  and miners  t o g e t h e r  i n  an  annual  
meet ing where t h e  two p a r t i e s  cou ld  j o i n t l y  e s t a b l i s h  p r i c e s  and 
wages, compet i t ion  among o p e r a t o r s  would be  reduced and o p e r a t o r s  
would be  a b l e  t o  r a i s e  wages above pove r ty  l e v e l s .  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  implementation of t h e  j o i n t  agreement, t h e  c o a l  
mining i n d u s t r y  was c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by d e s p o t i c  product ion  regimes, 
9 Coal employers were r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  c o a l  o p e r a t o r s .  I 
w i l l  f o l l ow  t h a t  convent ion throughout  t h i s  paper .  
largely because of excessive competition among operators. 
Devastating price wars among operators were the most immediate effect 
of virulent competition. In Illinois, for instance, coal that had 
sold for $1.52 per ton in 1882 sold for only $1.08 five years 
later. lo Operators complained bitterly of low prices and negligible 
profits. Indeed, the average coal operator made only a three or four 
percent profit from his coal. 
11 
Apart from the joint agreement, which operators resisted for a 
number of years because it required recognizing the UMWA, there were 
only three ways operators could respond to competition.12 The 
simplest solution for the individual operator, or so it might seem to 
an outsider, would be to sell his mine and invest the profits 
elsewhere. This would enable some operators to walk away from their 
disappointing investment, and it would also minimize the collective 
problem of too many competitors. This potential solution, however, 
was seriously flawed: operators commonly invested large sums in their 
mines and as a result were reluctant to let go of their investments 
when the selling price was deflated by price wars. As one operator 
explained, 
10 John R. Bowman, "When Workers Organize Capitalists: The 
Case of the Bituminous Coal Industry," Politics and Society 14 (1985) 
p. 293. 
11 Michael Nash, Conflict and Accommodation: Coal Miners, 
Steel Workers, and Socialism, 1890-1 920 (Westport, Conn . : Greenwood 
Press, 19821, p. 25. 
12 This discussion of the limited options available to coal 
operators given the market constraints they faced is informed by the 
strategies discussed in Albert 0. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1970) . 
persons who are in the coal business, or propose to go 
in, without a very healthy bank account, will soon come 
to grief. Of course, some will say, Why don't they sell 
out and quit? Easier said than done. If said persons 
know parties that are desirous of taking a hand in the 
business, send them this way; they can be accommodated on 
very good terms. 
13 
Operators also had the option of organizing into associations 
in order to collectively stabilize coal prices. This was a popular 
opt ion. 
14 
Indeed, the Black Diamond, the operators' trade journal, 
proclaimed that the "watchword and motto of the Black ~iamond for the 
coal trade, first and last, now and forever is organize, organize, 
organize. ,,I5 
Yet the enthusiasm that some operators had for collective 
action was not an effective antidote against the competitive spirit 
that others were unwilling to abandon. Assuming, as most economists 
do, that stable price-fixing agreements require the participation of 
firms responsible for about seventy-five percent of the industrial 
output, in 1895 and 1905 a stable price-fixing agreement would have 
required the participation of over three hundred firms (see Table I). 
Those operators who favored collective action were unable to convince 
such a large number of their competitors to participate; 
uncooperative operators took advantage of their cooperative 
13 Black Diamond, August, 1885, pp. 18-19. 
14 For more elaborate discussions of operators1 attempts to 
change market conditions see James P. Johnson, The Politics of Soft 
Coal, pp. 24-31. William Graebner in "Great Expectations: The Search 
for Order in Bituminous Coal, 1890-1917," Business History Review 
XLVIII (Spring 1973) : 49-72 and Black Diamond, August 15, 1889, p. 
49. 
15 Black ~iamond, February 1, 1890, p. 495. 
c o u n t e r p a r t s  by lowering t h e i r  p r i c e s  below t h e  l e v e l s  agreed  upon by 
members of  o p e r a t o r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  These t a c t i c s  enabled  t h e  less 
c o o p e r a t i v e  o p e r a t o r s  t o  g a i n  a  l a r g e r  s h a r e  of t h e  market a t  t h e  
expense of  o t h e r s ;  t hey  a l s o  compelled many o p e r a t o r s  who favored  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  abandon it i n  p r a c t i c e .  l6 Despi te  many 
e n t h u s i a s t i c  advoca tes  of c o l l e c t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  du r ing  t h e  l a t e  
n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry  t h e  bituminous c o a l  mining i n d u s t r y  remained, a s  
C .  E. Lesher,  e d i t o r  of t h e  t r a d e  p u b l i c a t i o n  Coal A g e ,  pu t  it, a s  
d i s o r g a n i z e d  a s  t h e  r e t a i l  g roce ry  b u s i n e s s .  
17 
The p r o h i b i t i v e  c o s t s  of l e a v i n g  t h e  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  f a i l u r e  
of  c o l l e c t i v e  o rgan iza t ion  l e f t  o p e r a t o r s  wi th  few op t ions :  t h e y  
needed t o  compensate f o r  low p r i c e s  by reduc ing  t h e i r  p roduct ion  
c o s t s ,  o r  t h e y  needed t o  f i n d  an a d d i t i o n a l  sou rce  of revenue. Many 
o p e r a t o r s  d i d  bo th .  Because t h e  bi tuminous c o a l  mining i n d u s t r y  was 
l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  -- t h e  c o s t  of l a b o r  was about  e i g h t y - t h r e e  pe rcen t  
of  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  of p roduct ion  i n  1889 -- wage r educ t ions  w e r e  t h e  
e a s i e s t  way of lowering c o s t s . 1 8  A s  a  r e s u l t  of f r equen t  wage 
r educ t ions ,  most c o a l  miners l i v e d  i n  c h r o n i c  d e b t .  l9 I n  add i t i on ,  
16 Black Diamond, February 13, 1897, p .  185. 
17 Quoted i n  United Mine Workers of  America, D i s t r i c t  2, 
"The Government of Coal," n .d .  (p robably  1921) ,  V e r t i c a l  F i l e s ,  
Tamiment Library ,  N e w  York Un ive r s i t y ,  p .  10 .  
18 I ob ta ined  i n d i c a t o r s  of l a b o r  i n t e n s i v i t y  f o r  I l l i n o i s  
( e igh ty - fou r  p e r c e n t ) ,  Indiana ( e i g h t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t ) ,  Ohio (e igh ty-  
f o u r  p e r c e n t ) ,  and Pennsylvania ( e i g h t y  p e r c e n t )  by d i v i d i n g  t h e  
t o t a l  wages r epo r t ed  i n  t h e  1890 census  by t h e  t o t a l  expend i tu re s .  
The f i g u r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  t e x t  is  t h e  mean of t h e  f o u r  s t a t e s .  
O r i g i n a l  f i g u r e s  a r e  from t h e  United S t a t e s  Bureau of t h e  Census, 
Mineral  I n d u s t r i e s  1890. Eleventh Census of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  Vol. 7  
(Washington: Government P r i n t i n g  Of f i ce ,  18921, p .  351. 
19 For miners '  comments about  d e b t  see t h e  Annual Report of 
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of I n t e r n a l  A f f a i r s  of t h e  Commonwealth of 
operators found additional revenue in vertical integration. During 
the late nineteenth century, approximately two thirds of all 
bituminous coal miners lived in company homes . 20 Operators found 
company homes and stores profitable because they built homes with 
cheap materials and charged high prices at the stores. 21 They also 
paid miners in script, money that was only honored at company stores, 
or issued miners credit at the company store. For the large 
proportion of miners who lived in debt, credit with their employers 
was a means of survival, but it also facilitated servitude to 
employers. 
Essentially, coal operators resorted to despotism to compensate 
for excessive competition. Remarking on the consequences of 
despotism, one observer concluded that 
The weakness of our economic system seems to be more 
glaringly conspicuous in the soft-coal industry than in 
any other. The conditions of living, of employment, and 
of business in large parts of the industry have for a 
long time ... been a blot upon a society.which calls 
itself civilized. 
2 2 
Yet from the operators' perspective, despotism was, at best, a 
stopgap measure. It enabled many who might otherwise have been 
forced from the market to secure small profits from their mines or 
Pennsylvania, Part 111, ~ndustrial Statistics, 1885, Vol. XI11 
(Harrisburg: E. K. Meyers, State Printer, 1886), pp. 170, 164. 
20 Michael Nash, Conflict and Accommodation, p. 43, fn 40. 
21 Stella Kaplan, Recent Developments in Housing for 
Bituminous Coal Miners (Masters thesis, university of Pittsburgh, 
1945), pp. 13-27. 
22 Joseph H. Willits quoted in Homer Lawrence Morris, The 
Plight of the Bituminous Coal Miner (Philadelphia: the University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 19341, p. v. 
from company homes and stores. At worst, despotism brought conflict 
with miners to a head. 
Miners were extraordinarily disillusioned. One miner said that 
operators profited from coal miners "On the same principle that the 
highwayman prof its from his victim. "23 Another concluded 
We are not paying our way, but going into debt every 
month. What few clothes we have are wearing out, our 
names for honesty and uprightness are getting tarnished, 
and yet it is not our fault, for we try to live within 
our income and cannot .... In conclusion, let me say that 
I will do anything that I can to give you information, 
and will be glad to do so, for by that means my craft may 
be recognized, and our country may make laws whereby a 
working man may make a decent living in this land of the 
so-called free. 
2 4 
Miners were also extraordinarily militant. Between 1881 and 
1886, miners in the four major coal producing states participated in 
1,671 strikes (see Table 11). The vast majority, ninety-six percent, 
of the strikes dealt with wages; only three percent concerned working 
conditions, and only one percent were sympathy strikes. Between 1887 
and 1893, miners initiated 350 strikes which affected 2,692 mines. 
2 5 
But coal miners did not find strikes a satisfactory response to 
their discontent; they won only one third of the strikes they engaged 
in between 1881 and 1886 (see Table 111). As one operator explained, 
23 Annual Report of the Secretary of Internal Affairs of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Part 111, Industrial Statistics, 1882- 
1883, p. 122. 
24 Annual Report of the Secretary of Internal Affairs of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Part 111, Industrial Statistics, 1885, 
p. 179. 
25 Michael Nash, Conflict and Accommodation, pp. 31-33. 
To attempt to improve his condition by a strike is like 
attempting to empty the ocean with a bucket, nay, it is 
worse, it is like plunging in and drowning himself. The 
waters close over [the striker], and that is all. So, if 
he strikes, another man takes his place, and that ends 
the story. 
2 6 
In fact, that did not end the story. Although coal miners 
usually lost the strikes they initiated, the strikes were a burden to 
operators, who often found themselves short of coal during the peak 
of the season. Moreover, operators' despotic survival tactics did 
not alter the competitive market conditions that motivated the 
tactics in the first place. 
As it turned out, the joint agreement was the most viable 
solution to operators' price wars and to miners' poverty and 
dependence. Significantly, it was UMWA members who coaxed, cajoled, 
and coerced operators into this mutually beneficial arrangement that 
transformed production regimes in the coal mining industry from 
despotic to hegemonic. 
British immigrants to the American coal mining industry 
conceived of the joint agreement. These immigrants carried with them 
the idea of using unions to assist employers in minimizing 
competition. Miners realized that competition among employers 
determined their own living and working conditions, and leaders of 
early American coal miners' unions were willing to sacrifice the 
right to strike for agreements that stipulated minimum prices and 
wages. Upon the formation of the UMWA in 1890, the idea of a 
2 6 Black Diamond, April 15, 1890, p. 694. 
cooperative venture remained the leading goal among miners, 
especially since many of the UMWA's first leaders were immigrants 
form Great Britain. But operators did not participate in the joint 
agreement willing; it was only after an unprecedented strike in 1897, 
during which state government officials supported miners, that 
operators reluctantly agreed to the plan. 
2 7 
Under the joint agreement miners received higher wages, the 
eight-hour day, the dues checkoff, and union recognition in exchange 
for their acceptance of the principle of competitive equality, the 
principle of conciliation and compromise, and the principle of the 
inviolability of agreements. The principle of competitive equality 
meant that miners' wages would vary according to local mining 
conditions; it was an attempt to regulate competition among employers 
by standardizing operating costs. The- principle of conciliation and 
compromise meant that coal miners would utilize formal grievance 
procedures prior to striking or engaging in other syndicalist 
activities at the point of production. And the principle of the 
inviolability of agreements meant that miners could not strike while 
working under a contract agreement. The goal of the joint agreement 
was to give miners an institutionally recognized voice in determining 
their wages and working conditions within parameters that ensured a 
minimum level of profit for employers. 
2 7 For a discussion of this critical strike see Sharon 
Reitman, Class Formation and Union Politi ,cs: The Western Federation 
o f  Miners and the  United Mine Workers o f  America, 1880-1910 (Ph.D. 
dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1991), pp. 233-248. 
The UMWA's role in designing and implementing the joint 
agreement is important because most discussions of production 
relations de-emphasize workers' capacity to self-consciously 
orchestrate transformations in class relations at the point of 
production. In Richard Edwards' model, for instance, the transition 
from simple (despotic) control to technical control was primarily an 
employer-initiated response to an increase in working-class 
resistance. In Michael Burawoy's model, the transition from despotic 
to hegemonic production regimes depended mostly on the separation of 
production from reproduction or, put differently, on state 
intervention in the production process. For both Edwards and 
Burawoy, workers are important insofar as their militancy inspires a 
response from either employers or state actors. I am suggesting that 
workers' role in shaping and even changing production regimes can be 
much more direct. Coal miners imposed the joint agreement, which 
transformed production relations from despotic to hegemonic, on coal 
operators. 
Despotism in the Metal Mining Industry 
In contrast to the coal mining industry, the market in the 
metal mining industry was dominated by a few firms. For instance, in 
Colorado, which produced one third of the nation's gold and silver, 
just seven percent of the firms were responsible for eighty percent 
of the state's production in 1902. 28 The literature on product 
market competition suggests that firms in concentrated markets can 
choose between accommodation and resistance to unions. On the one 
hand, these firms can afford to buy labor peace by granting union 
recognition and providing concessions to workers. On the other hand, 
these firms can afford to hire private detectives, withstand lengthy 
strikes, and employ other expensive tactics to resist unionization. 
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Given this choice, the question becomes under what circumstances will 
firms in concentrated markets choose to resist unionization? 
Metal mine employers chose despotism and resistance to the 
Western Federation of Miners because they had little control over the 
labor force. Metal miners were so powerful that in 1891 the manager 
< 
of one of the wealthiest mining companies in Idaho proclaimed that 
the "greatest thing we have to contend with now is the miners' 
union ! " 30 Another mine owner claimed that miners' strength was so 
impressive that the owners would have to either import nonunion 
workers or turn management entirely over to the miners. 
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One reason for metal miners' remarkable power over the 
conditions of their labor was their geographical mobility. Twenty- 
2 8 Michael Neuschatz, The  g o l d e n  Sword:  T h e  Coming o f  
C a p i t a l i s m  t o  the C o l o r a d o  Min ing  F r o n t i e r  (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1986) , pp. 42, 50. 
29 The literature on product market competition is discussed 
in Howard Kimeldorf, Reds  o r  R a c k e t s ?  T h e  Making  o f  R a d i c a l  and 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  U n i o n s  o n  the W a t e r f r o n t  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), pp. 52-55. 
30 Quoted in Robert Wayne Smith, T h e  C o e u r  d l A l e n e  Min ing  
War o f  1 8 9 2 :  A C a s e  S t u d y  o f  a n  I n d u s t r i a l  D i s p u t e  (Corvallis: Oregon 
State Publications, 1961), p. 12. 
31 Mark Wyman, Hard Rock E p i c :  Western Mines and  the 
I n d u s t r i a l  R e v o l u t i o n ,  1860-1910 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 19791, p. 53. 
one to thirty-seven percent of Western Federation members were 
transient between 1903 and 1912. 
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In Butte, Montana, a cooper 
mining community, about twenty-five percent of the miners "floated" 
from one camp to another in 1914, and another twenty-five percent 
changed camps annually.33 As one former miner explained, "We were 
young, footloose, and fancy free. We could get work in any camp and 
the pay was pretty good .... "34 Geographical mobility coupled with 
labor scarcity during part of the nineteenth century forced mine 
owners to compete for employees with high wages and accommodating 
labor policies. In addition, geographical mobility exposed miners to 
radical ideologies and militant traditions. According to government 
investigators, the lack of responsibility coupled with the sense of 
"injustice" that transient workers acquired during their travels 
served "as inflammable material for beguiling agitators to work 
upon. 1135 
32 Jim Foster, "The Ten Day Tramps," Labor History 23 (Fall 
1982), p. 621. 
33 Claude T. Rice, "Suggestions Regarding Mining Conditions 
and Points That in My Opinion Might Well Be Brought Out by Federal 
~nvestigation," p. 7, Box 10, Commission on Industrial Relations, 
General Records of the Department of Labor, Record Group 174, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
34 Arturo Jorquez is quoted in Jim Foster, "The Ten Day 
Tramps," p. 609. 
35 Report of the President's Mediation Commission to the 
President of the United States, 1918, p. 5, I11 Rockefeller Family 
Archives, Record Group 2 (Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller), 
Economic Interests Series, Box 14, Folder 106, Rockefeller Archive 
Center. Related discussions applied to the longshoremen's and 
seamen's unions are in Howard Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? pp. 20-27 
and Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, 
and Unionism in the 1930's (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 25-30. 
This  h igh  r a t e  of  geographica l  m o b i l i t y  c o n t r a s t s  s h a r p l y  wi th  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o a l  mining indus t ry ,whe re  miners  w e r e  r endered  
immobile by deb t  t o  t h e i r  employers.  Comparing c o a l  mining and me ta l  
mining communities, an  a r t i c l e  i n  t h e  United Mine Workers' Jou rna l  
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  
A coal-mining town is  d i f f e r e n t  from any o t h e r  community 
on e a r t h .  The p rospec to r  seek ing  go ld  wherever a  s t r i k e  
may be  found is  a  p e r i p a t e t i c  i n d i v i d u a l  whose home moves 
wi th  him. The s i lver -miner ,  copper-miner, nickel-miner ,  
lead-miner,  a l l  know t h a t  t h e i r  cont inuance  i n  one p l a c e  
depends on t h e  v a g a r i e s  of u n c e r t a i n  v e i n s  and ore-  
pocke ts .  So t h e y  make t h e i r  homes p l a c e s  of bu t  
t r a n s i e n t  abode, p repared  a t  any t i m e  t o  break  
housekeeping and move t o  ano the r  p a r t  of t h e  c o n t i n e n t .  
But a  c o a l  mine never  g i v e s  o u t .  From y e a r  t o  y e a r  t h e  
g r e a t  d r i f t s  and s h a f t s  and s l o p e s  run a  l i t t l e  f a r t h e r  
and deeper  i n t o  t h e  e a r t h ,  r e q u i r i n g  longe r  haulage and 
more machinery, bu t  t h e  c o a l  i s  always t h e r e .  And t h e  
c o a l  miner becomes a  f i x t u r e ,  working y e a r  a f t e r  yea r  i n  
t h e  same mine, r e a r i n g  a  family,  t h e  boy members of which 
w i l l  f o l l ow  i n  t h e  f o o t s t e p s  of t h e  f a t h e r ,  waxing o l d  i n  
t h e  same town where yea r s  be fo re  he, a  boy, had begun, 
perhaps,  a s  h i s  own sons w i l l  b eg in .  
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The average  owner of a  meta l  mine a l s o  had less c o n t r o l  over  
me ta l  miners '  community l i f e  t han  c o a l  o p e r a t o r s  had ove r  c o a l  
miners '  community l i f e .  For example, whereas a  m a j o r i t y  of c o a l  
miners  l i v e d  i n  company homes, many me ta l  miners  were a b l e  t o  choose 
t h e i r  housing.  Except i n  remote communities where company board ing  
houses w e r e  necessary ,  meta l  mining communities suppor ted  a  t h r i v i n g  
merchant c l a s s  and a  v a r i e t y  of housing op t ions .  I n  f a c t ,  some 
36 May 11, 1905,  p .  1. 
miners ran their own cooperative rooming houses. 37 In addition, 
whereas few coal operators permitted saloons in company towns, 
saloons were rampant in metal mining communities. The place of the 
saloon in the lives of hardrock miners paralleled that of the saloon 
in the lives of workers living in eastern and midwestern industrial 
centers. Saloons facilitated working-class comradery and autonomy 
from management. The solidarity and autonomy associated with these 
institutions in many working-class neighborhoods facilitated 
political mobilization. 
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Wage rates and strike patterns reflect metal miners' strength 
relative to coal miners. Metal miners1 incomes were about twice as 
high as coal miners (See Table IV). Metal miners also struck less 
frequently, a reflection most likely of their ability to secure 
favorable working conditions with minimal opposition from employers, 
and were more successful than coal miners when they did strike. In 
contrast to the 1,671 strikes among coal miners between 1881 and 
1886, metal miners living in the five major metal mining states 
participated in only three strikes during that entire period. The 
strikes affected a total of seven establishments, fewer than two 
percent of the establishments operating in each of the affected 
states. All three strikes were in opposition to a proposed wage 
37 Eugene Floyd Irey, A Social History of Leadville, 
Colorado, During the Boom Days, 1877-1881 (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1951), pp. 66-70. 
38 Jon M. Kingsdale, "The 'Poor Man's Club,': Social 
Functions of the Urban Working-Class Saloon." American Quarterly XXV 
(October 1973), pp. 473, 483; James R. Green, The World of the 
Workers: Labor in Twentieth Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 
19801, p. 8; Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront, pp. 24-25. 
reduction, and miners were successful in all three instances after 
just one week or less off the job (see Table V). 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, metal mine owners 
sought to acquire greater control of their employees. They organized 
amongst themselves and resorted to despotic labor practices to stop 
metal miners from "dictating" the affairs of the industry. 39 once 
organized, employers hired detectives to work alongside miners 
underground. Detective reports suggest that the mine owners were 
concerned with increasing their control over the production process 
and with identifying and purging from the mines the most militant 
workers. The underground environment, whether in coal mining or 
metal mining, was difficult to monitor because miners worked 
autonomously in rooms located in different parts of the mines. 
Employing detectives to work alongside miners afforded mine owners 
greater control over production. Moreover, miners who spoke ill of 
the companies or who advocated militant or radical labor policies 
were monitored, dismissed, or blacklisted. Most dramatically, 
employers resorted to strike-breaking tactics that were unprecedented 
in American labor history. In addition to imprisoning, blacklisting, 
and denying first amendment rights to miners, the mine owners even 
deported striking miners to neighboring states. 
In short, metal mine employers, who could afford to choose 
between accommodating and despotic strategies, chose despotic 
39 Idaho Springs News, September 11, 1903, p. 3. 
40 Detective reports may be found in John F. Campion Papers, 
Western Historical Collections, University of Colorado Libraries, 
Boulder; and the Collection 334 - Leadville Strike Reports, Colorado 
Historical Society. 
practices in response to an unusually autonomous, well organized, and 
powerful labor force. 
Some Consequences of Production Regimes 
The consequences of despotism in the metal mining industry were 
two-fold. Metal mine owners' strike-breaking tactics destroyed the 
WFM, turning the once powerful union into a small, ineffective 
organization. The dramatic strikes that took place at the turn of 
the century also contributed to the formation of a radical generation 
of miners. After a bitter strike in Colorado in 1903-04, one WFM 
member who had been deported stated that the WFM "is like the 
Irishman said of the Shamrock: 'The more you step on it the faster it 
grows. ' 'I 41 Another deportee urged those he left behind to vote the 
Socialist ticket. "We miners of Colorado are to-day largely of the 
opinion that the old idea of freedom for the citizen seems to have 
become an impossibility," he said.42 This radicalism survived in the 
WFM's successor union, the International Union of Mine Mill and 
Smelter Workers (IUMMSW), which metal miners organized in 1916. 
"Unfortunately," R. H. Ramsey stated in an article published in 1947 
in the metal mine owners' trade journal, "metal mining seems to be 
one of the basic industries of the United States most deeply affected 
by Communist infiltrati~n."~~ In 1950 the IUMMSW was one of eleven 
4 1 Miners' Magazine, June 30, 1904, p. 8. 
42 Ibid., May 19, 1904, p. 13. 
43 R. H. Ramsey, "Communism Menaces the Mining IndustryI1' 
~ngineering and Mining Journal 148 (July 1947) , p. 74. 
unions expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations on 
charges of Communist domination. 
The consequences of the joint agreement in the coal mining 
industry were more complex. Although few theorists are likely to 
disagree with the observation that despotic production practices are 
extremely costly for workers, many contend that cooperative 
agreements carry their own costs. Some theorists argue, for 
instance, that rank-and-file workers have been rendered powerless by 
the joint actions of employers and co-opted union officials. Others 
propose more insidious costs; workers who participate in cooperative 
arrangements with their employers inadvertently consent to their own 
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exploitation. 
The joint agreement was enormously beneficial because it 
empowered the UMWA, making it a formidable organization for operators 
to contend with and one of the leading unions in the country. The 
agreement also made it possible for operators to stabilize prices 
somewhat and increase miners' wages. Rather than being subject to 
wage reductions imposed by operators, coal miners became partners in 
negotiating the conditions of their labor. But the agreement was 
costly in that it introduced a new schism between the UMWA leadership 
and the rank-and-file and limited the UMWA's political options. 
44 Stanley Aronowitz, F a l s e  P r o m i s e s :  T h e  S h a p i n g  o f  
A m e r i c a n  W o r k i n g  C l a s s  C o n s c i o u s n e s s  (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1 9 7 3 )  ; 
David Brody, Workers i n  I n d u s t r i a l  A m e r i c a :  E s s a y s  on the T w e n t i e t h  
C e n t u r y  S t r u g g l e  (New York: Oxford university Press, 1 9 8 0 ) ;  Michael 
Burawoy, M a n u f a c t u r i n g  C o n s e n t ;  William Finlay, Work on the 
W a t e r f r o n t :  Worker P o w e r  a n d  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  C h a n g e  i n  a  West C o a s t  
P o r t  (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1 9 8 8 ) .  
The joint agreement empowered the UMWA because it was premised 
on equality between operators and miners. Union representatives and 
employers negotiated a new agreement annually. At joint conferences, 
both sides had the same number of representatives and the same number 
of votes. 
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In fact, the UMWA became so powerful that operators complained 
that they were at an organizational disadvantage. By 1926, forty-one 
operators' associations represented coal employers, fifteen of these 
associations -- responsible for sixty percent of the tonnage -- 
negotiated with one union that represented all organized coal 
miners.46 As a result of the disparity between miners and operators, 
according to one historian, 
The'miners have the advantage of a monopoly, in that 
their officers speak with a single and articulate voice 
for all the miners in the union districts. The operators 
are not so united and not so articulate. They are often 
less shrewd, less experienced, less intelligent -- it is 
no disparagement to say -- than their adversary. 4 7 
But the agreement also created discord between rank-and-file 
miners and the UMWA leadership. To convince operators to 
participate, UMWA leaders had agreed to discipline coal miners. 
45 The principles and procedures of the joint agreement are 
discussed at length in Arthur E. Suffern, The Coal Miners'  S t r u g g l e  
f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  S t a t u s  (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19261, p. 
185-208. 
4 6 Ibid., p. 171. 
4 7 Edward T. Devine, Coal: Economic Problems o f  t h e  Mining, 
Marketing and Consumption o f  A n t h r a c i t e  and S o f t  Coal i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  (Bloomington, Ill.: American Review Service Press, 19251, p. 
218. See also John S. Keir, "The Pittsburgh District," p. 19, Final 
District Reports-Causes of Strikes, Box 70, Records of the U.S. Coal 
Commission, Record Group 68, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
According t o  one d i s s a t i s f i e d  union m e m b e r ,  " t he  miners '  o f f i c i a l s ,  
i f  t h e y  l i v e  up t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  whether t h e y  l i k e  it o r  no t  a r e  
l i t t l e  b e t t e r  t h a n  p o l i c e  men f o r  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  t o  keep t h e  men a t  
work r e g a r d l e s s  of  what t h e i r  g r i evances  may be .  "48 I n  August 1901, 
f o r  example, t h e  UMWA execu t ive  board i n t e rvened  on beha l f  of t h e  
o p e r a t o r  of an  Ind iana  mine. The d i s p u t e  began when a miner,  f e a r i n g  
t h a t  h i s  work room was unsafe ,  l e f t  work e a r l y .  The mine r ' s  f e a r s  
were j u s t i f i e d ;  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  h i s  depa r tu re ,  t h e  roof caved i n  and 
b u r i e d  h i s  t o o l s .  The men working a t  t h e  mine r e fused  t o  work u n t i l  
t h e  company reimbursed t h e  miner f o r  t h e  f u l l  c o s t  of t h e  b u r i e d  
t o o l s ,  f i f t e e n  d o l l a r s .  The company, a l though no t  o b l i g e d  by t h e  
c o n t r a c t  t o  re imburse t h e  miner, o f f e r e d  him e leven  d o l l a r s .  The men 
s t i l l  r e f u s e d  t o  work u n t i l  t h e  company p a i d  t h e  f u l l  c o s t .  The 
execu t ive  board s e n t  t h e  fo l lowing  t e l eg ram t o  t h e  s t r i k i n g  miners:  
W e  a r e  i n s t r u c t e d  by t h e  Nat iona l  Execut ive Board t o  
n o t i f y  you and t h e  miners who a r e  on s t r i k e  a t  Cayuga 
t h a t  u n l e s s  t h e y  resume work Sa turday  morning, t h e  c o a l  
company w i l l  be  g iven  a u t h o r i t y  t o  employ o t h e r  men t o  
s t a r t  t h e  mines, and t h e  n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  
a s s i s t  them i n  do ing  s o .  
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UMWA o f f i c i a l s  were complying with t h e  j o i n t  agreement ' s  s t r i k e  
r u l e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  UMWA t o  supply  less con ten t ious  
miners  i n  c a s e s  of i l l e g a l  s t r ikes ,  t h e  j o i n t  agreement s p e c i f i e d  
t h a t  a l l  d i s t r i c t  and l o c a l  s t r i k e s  r e q u i r e d  t h e  p r i o r  approva l  of 
4 8  Edward Wieck, "The Mine Workers," p .  4, Box 9,  Wieck 
Co l l ec t i on ,  Archives  of Labor and Urban A f f a i r s ,  Wayne S t a t e  
u n i v e r s i t y .  
49 UMWA Execut ive Board t o  Local Union #141, August 9, 1901, 
R e e l  1, John M i t c h e l l  Papers .  
the international convention or international executive board. 
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Miners who struck in defiance of the UMWA received no strike 
assistance and were subject to fines and dismissal. Further, the 
joint agreement specified that coal miners had to keep working while 
their grievances were processed by a "court" of union representatives 
and operators. If a miner refused to work pending a solution, 
other union miners were required to take his place. Union miners who 
refused to replace their dissatisfied workmates were themselves 
subject to punishment as serious as dismissal. 
These strike rules were the object of much discontent among 
miners. Pressure to retain legitimacy with employers motivated union 
officials to discourage sympathetic action even during the most 
crucial strikes. When the UMWA called a strike among anthracite 
miners in 1902 in order to secure for them the gains that bituminous 
miners had won in 1897, UMWA President John Mitchell warned 
bituminous miners who were eager to assist their counterparts in the 
anthracite industry against illegal strike action: 
It has been the proud boast of the United Mine Workers of 
America that during the past years, since our 
organization became a power in the labor world, contracts 
based solely upon the honor and good faith of our union 
have under the most trying circumstances been kept 
inviolate; and in this supreme crisis a failure to live 
up to the high standard that has made our union pre- 
eminent among organizations of labor, would prove a 
substantiation of all the charges and allegations made 
against us by our enemies, and would confirm, beyond the 
possibility of refutation the specious argument of the 
5 0 Arthur E. Suffern, The Coal Miners' Struggle for 
Industrial Status, p. 162-163. 
a n t h r a c i t e  o p e r a t o r s  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  Mine Workers of 
America i s  an i r r e s p o n s i b l e  and u n s a f e  body wi th  which t o  
d e a l .  
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Miners found t h e  r u l e  a g a i n s t  sympathy s t r i k e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
d i s a g r e e a b l e .  "I have been a  member of  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s i n c e  it 
was founded," William Kincade t o l d  d e l e g a t e s  t o  t h e  1907 convent ion.  
I nursed  it i n  my hands and I t r o t t e d  it on my knee t o  
make it an o r d e r  t h a t  would be good f o r  eve ry  man i n  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  t h a t  mines c o a l  t o  be long  t o .  I have been 
a  miner f o r  f o r t y - f i v e  yea r s  and I have worked i n  f i v e  
d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s  .... When w e  founded t h e  United Mine 
Workers w e  in tended  t h a t  w e  should,  i f  one S t a t e  had t o  
be  c a l l e d  ou t ,  c a l l  ou t  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s  wi th  it.  W e  want 
a l l  t h e  s t a t e s  t o  come out  t o g e t h e r ,  and w e  want every  
man t o  s t a n d  by h i s  b ro the r ,  shou lde r  t o  shoulder ,  t o  
show t h e  o p e r a t o r s  what we can do.  I f  w e  d o n ' t  con t inue  
t h a t  po l i cy ,  i f  w e  go on s e t t l i n g  by s e c t i o n s ,  w e  might 
a s  w e l l  g i v e  up t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I f  w e  d o n ' t  go 
t o g e t h e r  and ask  f o r  a  s e t t l e m e n t  w e  had b e t t e r  abandon 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and le t  every  one set t le  f o r  h imse l f .  5  3  
Coal miners  a l s o  complained t h a t  t h e  j o i n t  agreement o f f e r e d  
less t h a n  it had i n i t i a l l y  promised. Some claimed t h a t  o p e r a t o r s  
found ways around t h e  r u l e s ;  t h e  h i s t o r y  of  t h e  j o i n t  agreement, 
a cco rd ing  t o  one c o a l  miner, was a  h i s t o r y  of "Broken Promises.  11 5 4 
Others  main ta ined  t h a t  miners were l o o s i n g  "customs" t h a t  t h e y  had 
h e l d  s a c r e d  f o r  y e a r s .  "In a  f i e l d  where a few y e a r s  ago it was an 
51  John M i t c h e l l  tes t imony,  Commission on I n d u s t r i a l  
Re l a t i ons ,  Final Report and Testimony, (Washington, D . C . :  Government 
P r i n t i n g  Of f i ce ,  1916) ,  pp. 405-406. 
52 Quoted i n  Andrew Roy, A History o f  t he  Coal Miners o f  the  
United S ta tes  (Westport ,  Conn.: Greenwood P re s s ,  1905, 1970 r e p r i n t ) ,  
p .  419. 
5 3  I b i d . ,  p .  337. 
5  4 Tom L.  L e w i s  t o  UMWA P r e s i d e n t  Michael Ratchford,  
September 29, 1898, R e e l  1, John M i t c h e l l  Papers .  
almost utter impossibility to discharge a man," miner T. J. Llewellyn 
said, "today so many are being discharged that we hardly take notice 
of it. m55 
Miners expressed their dissatisfaction in militant actions. 
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Between April 1, 1914 and March 31, 1915, Illinois miners initiated 
forty-two suspensions, usually over disagreeable working conditions 
or unclear payment provisions under the joint agreement. Most of the 
time, union-operator "courts" sanctioned miners rather than operators 
for the suspensions, even though miners claimed that the suspensions 
resulted from operators' violations of the joint agreement. 
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Employers warned UMWA officials that they would discontinue 
their participation in the joint agreement if the union leaders did 
not learn how to better control rank-and-file miners. In 1905, the 
Indiana Bituminous Coal Operator's Association passed a resolution to 
suspend the checkoff and their mining operations if miners continued 
to engage in illegal strikes.58 Union officials responded to 
employer threats by sending out circulars admonishing miners for 
their delinquent behavior. They typically relied on guilt to bring 
the coal miners into line. In response to an illegal strike in 1906, 
55 United Mine Workers of America, Proceedings of the 
Eighteenth Annual Convention, 1907, p. 317. 
56 John Mitchell testimony, Commission on Industrial 
Relations, Final Report and Testimony, p. 406. 
57 Forty-five percent of the suspensions resulted in 
sanctions against miners and/or the UMWA; only two percent resulted 
in sanctions against operators. The rest of the cases were either 
compromised, sent to a higher board, or dropped. The figures cited 
in this paragraph are adapted from data located in Box 17, Commission 
on Industrial Relations, General Records of the Department of Labor, 
Record Group 174, National Archives. 
58 United Mine Workers Journal (hereafter cited as UMwJ), 
March 23, 1905, p. 1. 
John H. Walker, president of District 12 in Illinois, admonished 
miners, 
You have violated your contract. This contract is not 
perfect .... But it is uniformly much better than what we 
had before. To obtain this contract many miners have 
courageously fought, millions of dollars have been spent 
by the union, many men and women have not hesitated to 
undergo the bitterest hardships to conquer this contract, 
and you now believe that your fellow miners will allow 
you to break this contract simply because it pleases you 
to do so. 
5 9 
UMWA officials even attempted to resocialize miners by 
publishing articles on proper etiquette in the union journal. One 
article, "The True Gentleman", stated the following: 
The gentleman is distinguished from he who is not a 
gentleman by moral qualities which have justly-won the 
highest place in the respect and admiration of the world. 
The gentleman restrains his passions and subdues his 
selfishness; he considers the comforts of others before 
his own; he respects the personality of those with whom 
he is brought in contact; he never takes an unfair 
advantage; he is scrupulously regardful of his own honor, 
doubly scrupulous if the honor of others be committed to 
his keeping; he may lack mental culture, but he is never 
without moral refinement; he may have an unpolished 
exterior, but never a base nature; courage he has, but 
shows it less in facing danger than in meeting 
responsibility; if not always sincere, he is always 
reliable; and to him may be safely committed all that 
others hold most dear, in whose manly traits are 
penetrated and modified by the gentleness of woman's 
nature; and who still preserves and endeavors to 
constantly act upon the manliest of instincts -- 
magnanimity. 
6 0 
59 Quoted in Michael Nash, Conflict and Accommodation, p. 
94. 
60 UMWJ, September 28, 1905, p. 7. 
Moreover, t h e  UMWA l e a d e r s h i p  d i scouraged  p o l i t i c a l  involvement 
except  l e g i s l a t i v e  reforms t o  improve s a f e t y  i n  t h e  mines and t h e  
e l e c t i o n ,  w i th in  t h e  two-party system, of workers t o  p o l i t i c a l  
o f f i c e .  They d i d  t h i s  i n  o r d e r  t o  appease o p e r a t o r s ,  who main ta ined  
t h a t  because c o a l  miners  were b e t t e r  organized,  t h e  UMWA was capable  
of add re s s ing  c o a l  miners '  i n t e r e s t s  wi thout  r e s o r t i n g  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  
a c t i o n .  61 Opera tors  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  withdraw from t h e  agreement i f  t h e  
UMWA p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  found 
d i s a g r e e a b l e .  I n  response,  t h e  UMWA l e a d e r s h i p  worked c l o s e l y  wi th  
o p e r a t o r s  t o  purge members of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s y n d i c a l i s t  
I n d u s t r i a l  Workers of t h e  World (which members of t h e  WFM had p layed  
a  key r o l e  i n  o rgan iz ing )  from t h e  c o a l  mines.  62 
I n  s p i t e  of t h e i r  f r u s t r a t i o n s ,  miners  g e n e r a l l y  conceded t h a t  
t h e  j o i n t  agreement was an improvement over  t h e  despot ism of t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry .  Within t h e  UMWA, even s o c i a l i s t s ,  who most 
s t r o n g l y  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  j o i n t  agreement was i n  need of mod i f i ca t i ons ,  
g e n e r a l l y  suppor ted  it i n  t heo ry .  S o c i a l i s t s  advocated g r e a t e r  
democracy wi th in  t h e  union -- t h e y  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o f f i c e r s  had acqu i r ed  t o o  much power th rough t h e  j o i n t  agreement -- 
b u t  t h e y  maintained t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  ba rga in ing  was necessary  t o  
r e g u l a t e  c o a l  p r i c e s  and wages.63 One miner defended t h e  j o i n t  
61 A.  M .  Daly, "Bituminous Coal Mining i n  t h e  S t a t e  of Ohio 
With Spec i a l  Reference t o  I n d u s t r i a l  Re l a t i ons , "  p .  8-9. 
62 R .  J .  Bobba Case, F i l e :  D i s t r i c t  6  - 1923, United Mine 
Workers of America Archives  and L ib ra ry .  
63 Arthur  C. Ever l ing ,  Tact ics  Over Strategy i n  the  United 
Mine Workers o f  America: Internal P o l i t i c s  and the  Question o f  the  
Nationalization o f  the  Mines, 1908-1923 (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  
Pennsylvania  S t a t e  Un ive r s i t y ,  1976) ,  pp. 4 ,  44-57, 111-112. Frank 
agreement and t h e  UMWA's r e t r e a t  from p o l i t i c s  on t h e  grounds t h a t  
even Marx s a i d  t h a t  workers should t r y  t o  improve working cond i t i ons  
whi le  w a i t i n g  f o r  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  w e r e  r i p e  f o r  
r e v o l u t i o n .  6 4  I n  s h o r t ,  miners consented t o  t h e  j o i n t  agreement 's  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  bu t  r e se rved  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  bo th  o p e r a t o r s  
and union o f f i c i a l s  when they  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  agreement was u n f a i r  o r  
poo r ly  en fo rced .  
Conc lus ions  
This  paper  has  had two aims. The f i r s t  was t o  draw a t t e n t i o n  
t o  t h e  prominent r o l e  t h a t  workers may p l a y  i n  shaping  product ion  
r e l a t i o n s .  Most t h e o r e t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  p roduc t ion  r e l a t i o n s  
assume t h a t  t h e y  a r e  determined by employers, by s t a t e  p o l i c i e s ,  o r  
by impersonal  market f o r c e s .  Researchers  accord  workers on ly  an 
i n d i r e c t  r o l e ;  g e n e r a l l y  speaking, t hey  sugges t  t h a t  working-class 
m i l i t a n c y  may i n s p i r e  employers o r  s t a t e  a c t o r s  t o  i n s t i t u t e  changes 
i n  p roduc t ion  r e l a t i o n s .  Although I found t h i s  t o  be  t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  
me ta l  mining i n d u s t r y ,  whe-re miners '  independent  work h a b i t s  i n s p i r e d  
t h e i r  employers t o  adopt  d e s p o t i c  l a b o r  p o l i c i e s ,  it was no t  t h e  c a s e  
i n  t h e  c o a l  mining i n d u s t r y .  There, miners  d i d  more t han  i n s p i r e  
o t h e r s ;  t h e y  i n i t i a t e d  t h e  s h i f t  from d e s p o t i c  t o  hegemonic 
product  i o n  regimes. 
J.  Hayes tes t imony,  Commission on I n d u s t r i a l  Re l a t i ons ,  F i n a l  Report 
and Testimony, p .  4 5 3 .  
6 4  UMWJ, February, 23,  1905 ,  p .  4 .  
The second aim of this paper was to assess the consequences of 
the two types of production regimes in the mining industries. 
Despotism in the metal mining industry simultaneously weakened and 
radicalized organized miners. Hegemony in the metal mining industry, 
by contrast, simultaneously strengthened the UMWA and pushed it 
toward conservative union politics. 
The obvious question that arises from these consequences is 
whether cooperative agreements between workers and employers 
inevitably result in working-class conservatism. This is in fact the 
assumption behind the literature on the post-World War I1 labor 
capital accord, of which the joint agreement in the coal mining 
industry was a forerunner. The literature suggests that class 
conflict in the United States has become institutionalized along 
narrow economic lines and that these economic struggles preclude 
attention to political issues. 
65 
I propose that the answer to the question of whether 
cooperative agreements inevitably result in working-class 
conservatism depends on whether the discussion is about workers or 
about labor movements. With respect to workers, I would argue that 
cooperative agreements set limits on working-class political behavior 
but do not necessarily preclude self-conscious, even radical, 
political mobilization. One reason why they do not is that 
cooperative agreements are mutually beneficial; employers may 
threaten to discontinue participation in cooperative plans, but in 
6 5 See, for example, Beth Rubin, "Class Struggle American 
Style. 
some cases to carry out the threat would be quite costly. Coal 
operators, for instance, reaped many rewards from the joint 
agreement. Most importantly, the agreement enabled them to organize 
-- a task they failed to accomplish without coal miners' assistance - 
- in the interests of higher profits. In such cases, where the costs 
of discontinuing cooperative agreements are high for employers, they 
are likely to overlook some working-class behaviors they find 
distasteful. For example, although the national UMWA leaders 
discouraged radical politics, some districts and several locals 
embraced radical politics. Operators may have complained about this, 
and the national UMWA leaders may have felt compelled to formally 
distance the organization from political commitments, but the joint 
agreement did not preclude political action among coal miners at the 
local level. 
With respect to the labor movement, cooperative agreements may 
set more rigid political boundaries. Such agreements may result in 
discord between workers and union representatives, as the joint 
agreement did. Or, if employers are threatened by political action, 
cooperative agreements may make it difficult for unions to use the 
full force of their collective strength for political action. 
In short, it may be less the case that workers have become 
satisfied with limiting their claims to bread-and-butter issues or 
that they inadvertently consent to their own exploitation by 
cooperating with employers at the point of production, than that 
hegemonic production regimes limit political activity to a less 
visible and less organized arena. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE AND NUMBER OF BITUMINOUS COAL COMPANIES BY SIZE OF OUTPUT, 
UNITED STATES, 1895-1925 
Percentage of Total Percentage of 
Number of Producers Total Production 
Output 
(Tons) 1895 1905 1920 1895 1905 1920 
Less than 
10,000 47.3% 42.8% 37.4% 2.1% 1.6% 1.6% 
1,055~ 1,492 2,349 
500,000 
or more 1.4% 2.8% 3.0% 29.2% 48.3% 47.8% 
a 
The number of producers is listed below the percentage of producers. 
Source: United States Coal Commission, Report of the United States 
Coal Commission (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 
1891; and John R. Bowman, Economic Competition and Collective Action: 
The Politics of Market Organization in the Bituminous Coal Industry, 
1880-1940. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 19841, p.137. 
TABLE I1 
NUMBER OF COAL MINING ESTABLISHMENTS EXPERIENCING STRIKES IN 
ILLINOIS, INDIANA, OHIO, AND PENNSYLVANIA, 1881-1886 
Illinois 
a 
Indiana Ohio Pennsylvania 
Total 2 91 4 3 4 8 3 8 5 4 1,671 
b 
a 
The original source does not differentiate between anthracite and 
bituminous coal firms. This is most likely to affect the figures for 
Pennsylvania. 
b~hese data may be compared with data in Table V if the total number 
of mining establishments in each state is taken into account. The 
1880 census provides the best approximation of the total number of 
establishments. In 1880 there were 590 establishments in Illinois, 
216 in Indiana, 618 in Ohio, and 666 in Pennsylvania. United States 
Bureau of the Census, R e p o r t  on t h e  M i n i n g  I n d u s t r i e s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  1880 .  T e n t h  C e n s u s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  Vol. XV (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1885), pp. 642, 644, 662, 666. 
Source: United States Bureau of Labor, T h i r d  Annual  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
Commiss ioner  o f  Labor ,  1887,  S t r i k e s  and L o c k o u t s  (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 106-81, 440-79, 488-559. 
TABLE I11 
SUCCESS OF COAL MINING STRIKES IN ILLINOIS, INDIANA, OHIO, AND 
PENNSYLVANIA, BY YEAR 
a 
Successful Unsuccessful Total 
1881 61% 3 9 % 100% 
(103) (67) (170) 
(72 (197) (269) 
Total 34% 66% 100% 
(569) (1102) (1671) 
a 
Includes 89 strikes classified as partially successful. 
Source: United States Bureau of Labor, T h i r d  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  o f  the 
C o m m i s s i o n e r  o f  L a b o r ,  1 8 8 7 ,  S t r i k e s  a n d  L o c k o u t s  (Washington: 
Government printing Office, 1888), pp. 106-81, 440-79, 488-559. 
TABLE IV 
AVERAGE DAILY WAGES, DAYS WORKED, AND ANNUAL EARNINGS BY STATE FOR 
COAL MINERS AND GOLD AND SILVER MINERS, 1889 
State Daily Waqes Days Worked Annual Earnings 
Coal Miners 
Illinois $1.95 177 $345.15 
Indiana $1.89 175 $330.75 
Ohio $1.95 18 1 $352.95 
Pennsylvania $1.93 210 $405.30 
Gold and Silver Miners 
Arizona $3.17 215 $681.55 
Colorado $3.08 244 $751.52 
Idaho $3.59 206 $739.54 
Montana $3.48 2 92 $1016.16 
Nevada $3.60 248 $892.80 
Source: united States.Bureau of the Census, M i n e r a l  I n d u s t r i e s  i n  the 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  1890.  E l e v e n  Census  of the U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  Vol. 7 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1892), pp. 350, 59-60. 
TABLE V 
NUMBER OF METAL MINING ESTABLISHMENTS EXPERIENCING STRIKES, 1881-1886 
Arizona Colorado 
1883 0 4 
Total 2 5 a 
a 
All of the strikes listed were successful. The Commissioner of 
Labor reported no strikes for Idaho, Montana, and Nevada during the 
entire 1881-1886 time period. In order to compare these data with 
data in Table I1 it is necessary to control for the number of mines 
in each state. The census reported 232 deep mines in ~rizona and 246 
in Colorado in 1880. Assuming that those figures closely approximate 
the number of establishments in 1883 and 1884, fewer than two percent 
of the establishments in Colorado experienced strikes in 1883. Fewer 
than one percent of the establishments in Colorado and fewer than one 
percent in Arizona experienced strikes in 1884. Using data provided 
in Table 2.9, Chapter 2, an estimated thirteen percent of the coal 
mining establishments in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 
experienced strikes in 1883, and an estimated sixteen percent 
experienced strikes in 1884. United States Bureau of the Census, 
S t a t i s t i c s  and T e c h n o l o g y  o f  t h e  P r e c i o u s  M e t a l s  1880 .  T e n t h  Census  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  Vol. XI11 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1885), pp. 511-515. 
Source: United States Bureau of Labor, T h i r d  Annual  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
Commiss ioner  o f  Labor  1887.  S t r i k e s  and  L o c k o u t s  (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 36-39, 52-55. 
